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INTRODUCTION
Antitrust law treads a fine line between creation of a status
offense for dominant commercial organizations on the one
hand, and devolution into incomprehensibly complex legal
standards on the other. The Sherman Antitrust Act1 prohibits
anticompetitive business practices, for which draconian penalties are contemplated by the Act and subsequent legislation.2
The difficulty of drawing legal distinctions between anticompetitive conduct and aggressively competitive conduct, however,
is a significant obstacle to achieving the policy objectives of the
Act.3 When faced with allegedly anticompetitive business prac1

15 U.S.C. §§ 1–3 (2012).
Penalties for felony violations of the Sherman Act might include a fine of up
to $100,000,000 for a corporation, $1,000,000 for an individual, or imprisonment
for up to ten years. Id. Any jury award in a private action is automatically trebled.
Id. § 15.
3
For example, in 1967, the Supreme Court declared that vertical “exclusive
territory” resale restraints were anticompetitive per se, at least where the manufacturer has parted with “dominion” over the merchandise. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 375–76, 379 (1967), overruled by Cont’l T. V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). For a decade, courts applied this
rule to find that vertical restraints violated the Sherman Act. See, e.g., United
States v. Glaxo Grp. Ltd., 302 F. Supp. 1, 9 (D.D.C. 1969) (commenting that
“[h]owever laudable the motive,” vertical restraints constitute a per se violation of
the Sherman Act); Kugler v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 293 A.2d 682, 699 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1972) (finding that a manufacturer’s vertical restraints on the
distribution and marketing of its products violated the Sherman Act); see also
Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the
Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 282, 295–99 (1975) (discussing inconsistency of the law with
underlying economic policy and critiquing the Arnold, Schwinn & Co. decision as
lacking an economic rationale). But in 1977, the Court reversed tack, abandoning
2

R
R
R
R

R
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tices, courts recognize the risk of chilling conduct that can, in
some circumstances, be procompetitive and salutary to consumers.4 For example, predatory pricing by a monopolist
might drive nascent competitors from the market and lead to
long-term monopoly entrenchment, but in a less concentrated
market the same conduct looks a lot like a procompetitive price
war, resulting in lower prices for consumers.5
Another obstacle to achieving the policies of the Sherman
Act is the difficulty of applying the law to a range of everinnovative business practices without exploding the legal standards beyond manageability.6 Simple legal standards provide
greater predictability and minimize the risk of chilling procompetitive conduct.7 But simplifying the legal standard creates
two risks: first, an underinclusive standard eviscerates the
strong deterrent intent of the Act; second, an overinclusive
standard begins to resemble a status offense for businesses
in concentrated markets. In the United States, antitrust
law stops short of declaring the status of “monopoly” a violation of the law,8 perhaps reflecting the legal community’s genthe per se rule against vertical price restraints, and in 2007 the Court finally
declared that even vertical resale price restraints may in fact be procompetitive in
certain circumstances. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551
U.S. 877, 890 (2007); GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 57–59.
4
See, e.g., Leegin, 551 U.S. at 895 (“[Per se rules of antitrust liability] can be
counterproductive. They can increase the total cost of the antitrust system by
prohibiting procompetitive conduct the antitrust laws should encourage.”).
5
See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,
223–24 (1993) (“That below-cost pricing may impose painful losses on its target is
of no moment to the antitrust laws if competition is not injured: It is axiomatic
that the antitrust laws were passed for ‘the protection of competition, not competitors.’” (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962))).
6
See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609 & n.10 (1972)
(emphasizing the importance of predictability because “courts are of limited utility
in examining difficult economic problems” and have not been left free by Congress
to “ramble through the wilds of economic theory in order to maintain a flexible
approach”). But see Leegin, 551 U.S. at 895 (“[A]dministrative ‘advantages are not
sufficient in themselves to justify the creation of per se rules.’” (quoting GTE
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 50, n.16)).
7
See Topco, 405 U.S. at 609–10 n.10.
8
See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429–30 (2d
Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, J.) (by certification of the Supreme Court, pursuant to 15
U.S.C. § 29 (2012)) (“[P]ersons may unwittingly find themselves in possession of a
monopoly, automatically so to say: that is, without having intended either to put
an end to existing competition, or to prevent competition from arising when none
had existed; they may become monopolists by force of accident. Since the Act
makes ‘monopolizing’ a crime, as well as a civil wrong, it would be not only unfair,
but presumably contrary to the intent of Congress, to include such instances. . . .
A single producer may be the survivor out of a group of active competitors, merely
by virtue of his superior skill, foresight and industry. . . . The successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins.”).

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-2\CRN204.txt

470

unknown

Seq: 4

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

30-DEC-15

11:16

[Vol. 101:467

eral aversion to anything approaching a criminal status
offense.9
Nonetheless, anticompetitive outcomes, rather than conduct undertaken with the anticompetitive intent, are the focus
of the Sherman Act.10 Put simply, the Sherman Act protects
“competition, not competitors,” and, sometimes, inefficient victims suffer in healthy competitive markets.11 One problematic
aspect of antitrust law is that courts are often asked to estimate damages and predict anticompetitive outcomes, a task
that sometimes requires a court to “ramble through the wilds of
economic theory.”12
Skirting questions of causation that remain unsettled in
academic economic debate, courts cautiously draw judicially
manageable bounds to antitrust liability, focusing on conduct
that will almost always result in anticompetitive outcomes.13
To this end, courts treat differently monopolization claims
under § 2 of the Sherman Act—where the threshold question is
whether the defendant has or is likely to acquire dominant
market power14—from cartel and conspiracy claims under § 1
of the Sherman Act—where antitrust liability may be found
even absent significant market power on the part of any individual defendant.15 This distinction is made because courts
9
See Joseph L. McEntee, Jr. & Robert C. Kahrl, Damages Caused by the
Acquisition and Use of Monopoly Power, 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 165, 166 (1980) (asserting that even where the status of the defendant may be deemed anticompetitive,
some conduct by the defendant is always required to constitute a violation of the
antitrust laws).
10
See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762 (1984)
(“[W]e [have] emphasized that the legality of arguably anticompetitive conduct
should be judged primarily by its ‘market impact.’” (quoting GTE Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. at 51)).
11
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
12
Topco, 405 U.S. at 622 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). On the other hand,
courts do eventually adopt bright-line “per se” rules prohibiting certain categories
of business practices as anticompetitive once experience has shown that a business practice is “always or almost always [likely] to restrict competition.” Broad.
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1979).
13
See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886
(2007) (noting that agreements among competitors to fix prices or divide markets
almost always restrict competition).
14
See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,
481 (1992) (defining monopoly power as “power to control prices or exclude competition” (quoting United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377,
389–91 (1956))).
15
See F.T.C. v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 433–36 (1990)
(“Conspirators need not achieve the dimensions of a monopoly, or even a degree of
market power any greater than that . . . disclosed by this record, to warrant
condemnation under the antitrust laws.” (emphasis added)).
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consider anticompetitive conspiracies to be especially likely to
result in anticompetitive outcomes.16
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract,
combination . . . or conspiracy[ ] in restraint of trade.”17 Courts
have read into § 1 a strict requirement of concerted action between independent firms in order to draw the line between
procompetitive and anticompetitive conduct where defendant
businesses have less than monopoly power.18 Unilateral action
is categorically exempt from § 1,19 but where concerted action
is shown it becomes unnecessary for the state or plaintiff to
demonstrate that the defendants had a significant likelihood of
succeeding in establishing market dominance.20 Courts justify
stricter treatment of erstwhile competitors on the theory that,
in a competitive market, they have no business colluding to
make anticompetitive practices profitable.21
In the context of corporations, a corporate defendant is
generally incapable of conspiring with its own agents or divisions (a contrary approach would extend conspiracy liability to
every claim against a corporation).22 Separate divisions of a
single corporation are treated as a single entity in antitrust law,
incapable of conspiring amongst themselves.23 The fact that
alleged conspirators operated as part of a single corporate en16
See Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768–69 (1984)
(“Concerted activity inherently is fraught with anticompetitive risk. . . . Of
course, . . . mergings [sic] of resources may well lead to efficiencies that benefit
consumers, but their anticompetitive potential is sufficient to warrant scrutiny
even in the absence of incipient monopoly.”); Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493
U.S. at 433–36 (“Whatever economic justification particular price-fixing agreements may be thought to have, the law does not permit an inquiry into their
reasonableness. They are all banned because of their actual or potential threat to
the central nervous system of the economy.” (quoting United States v. SoconyVacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 225–26 & n.59 (1940))).
17
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
18
See, e.g., United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (“[T]he
act does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged
in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion
as to parties with whom he will deal.”).
19
See, e.g., Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 768–69 (holding that the Sherman Act
“does not reach conduct that is ‘wholly unilateral’” (quoting Albrecht v. Herald
Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149 (1968))); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S.
752, 760–61 (1984) (holding that “[i]ndependent action is not proscribed”).
20
See Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 433–36.
21
See Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 768–69 (“The reason Congress treated concerted behavior more strictly than unilateral behavior is readily appreciated. Concerted activity inherently is fraught with anticompetitive risk. It deprives the
marketplace of the independent centers of decisionmaking that competition assumes and demands.”).
22
See id. at 769–71.
23
See id.
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tity disproves concerted action, the threshold requirement for
liability under § 1 of the Sherman Act, and therefore is a complete defense against a claim under § 1.24
The unilateral action defense becomes more complicated,
however, where alleged conspirators are separately incorporated but part of the same complex corporate family. Until the
mid-1980s, the prevailing bright-line rule held that “[where defendants] availed themselves of the privilege of doing business
through separate corporations, the fact of common ownership
could not save them from [antitrust liability].”25 But the Supreme Court rejected this approach in Copperweld Corp. v.
Independent Tube Corp.26
The Copperweld Court reasoned that the central concern of
§ 1 was the anticompetitive risk of agreements that “deprive[ ]
the marketplace of the independent centers of decisionmaking
that competition assumes and demands,” a concern that did
not lend itself to mechanical treatment of separately incorporated defendants.27 Where, as in Copperweld, the parent defendant wholly owns the subsidiary defendant, the interests of
the two are so closely aligned that conceptualizing the two as
separate decision makers is absurd.28 The Court expressly restricted its ruling to situations such as the one before it, however, involving a parent corporation and a wholly owned,
though separately incorporated, subsidiary.29 The Copperweld
Court declined to reach the question of the degree of functional
control between a parent and less than wholly owned subsidiary required for the two to constitute a single center of decision
making, incapable of conspiracy.30
The Copperweld Court rejected the prevailing bright-line
approach to the threshold test of corporate concerted action in
favor of a (sometimes difficult) factual analysis of the realities of
corporate decision making.31 This approach is a departure
from the usual inclination of antitrust courts, favoring man24

See id.
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 141–42 (1968).
26
467 U.S. 752 (1984).
27
Id. at 769.
28
See id. at 772, 774.
29
Id. at 767.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 773 (“Especially in view of the increasing complexity of corporate
operations, a business enterprise should be free to structure itself in ways that
serve efficiency of control, economy of operations, and other factors dictated by
business judgment without increasing its exposure to antitrust liability.”).
25
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ageable legal standards over economically complex ones.32 The
Copperweld decision reflects a tension between this inclination
and the requirements of antitrust enforceability: the Court cautions that antitrust law should not manipulate the choice of
corporate structure.33 Copperweld’s important contribution is
its doctrinal emphasis on independent decision making, and its
illustrative formulation of the threshold question of § 1 liability:
Absent the agreement, would the alleged conspirators, in fact,
compete?34
Following Copperweld’s rejection of a bright-line approach,
however, lower courts have failed to converge upon a consistent
approach to the unilateral action defense where alleged conspirators are members of the same corporate family.35 Some
courts have fallen back on various new bright-line rules,36
while others have suggested a factor-balancing approach.37
The case law provides little clarity and few judicially manageable standards to courts confronted with antitrust claims
against complex corporate families.38 This Note will, in part,
attempt to determine where the inconsistencies emerge in the
current analytical frameworks.
32
See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609–10 (1972)
(noting that courts favor bright-line rules in antitrust cases because “courts are of
limited utility in examining difficult economic problems”).
33
See Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 773. But see Fraser v. Major League Soccer,
L.L.C., 284 F.3d 47, 56 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding irrelevant the fact that American
Major League Soccer may have been designed so as to avoid antitrust liability;
note that sports leagues are given special treatment under antitrust law in numerous regards); Michael P. Waxman, Fraser v. MLS, L.L.C.: Is There A Sham
Exception to the Copperweld Single Entity Immunity?, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV.
487, 495–99 (2001) (suggesting that Fraser might have held otherwise).
34
Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 768–69 (“In any conspiracy, two or more entities
that previously pursued their own interests separately are combining to act as one
for their common benefit. This not only reduces the diverse directions in which
economic power is aimed but suddenly increases the economic power moving in
one particular direction.”).
35
Compare Advanced Health-Care Servs., Inc. v. Radford Cmty. Hosp., 910
F.2d 139, 146 (4th Cir. 1990) (concluding that two subsidiaries wholly owned by
the same parent corporation are legally incapable of conspiring with one another),
with Aspen Title & Escrow, Inc., v. Jeld-Wen, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 1477, 1488 (D.
Or. 1987) (finding that two subsidiaries that are less than wholly owned by a
parent corporation may conspire with one another).
36
See, e.g., Leaco Enters., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 737 F. Supp. 605, 608–09
(D. Or. 1990) (adopting a rule that a parent and subsidiary constitute a unilateral
actor for § 1 purposes where, under applicable corporate law, the parent could
force a merger).
37
See, e.g., Direct Media Corp. v. Camden Tel. & Tel. Co., 989 F. Supp. 1211,
1216 (S.D. Ga. 1997) (weighing factors including “the interests and objectives of
each company” and the identity of “significant decision makers”).
38
For further discussion of post-Copperweld confusion, see Princeton Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Erie Insurance Co., 690 S.E.2d 587, 594 (W. Va. 2009).
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Clarifying this analysis will create a more judiciable standard for the threshold question of conspiracy under § 1, which
would allow judges to dispose of some meritless claims before
reaching the imbroglio of projected anticompetitive economic
outcomes. A coherent framework must also reflect the important considerations underlying antitrust law: in particular,
consumer protection and promotion of competitive markets.39
A flexible standard is required, but one that also provides clarity to courts.
This Note will consider the appropriateness for this purpose of the factors weighed in a similar analysis under corporate law: whether a parent corporation exerts sufficient control
over a subsidiary to justify “piercing the corporate veil.” Differences in policy and theory between the two analyses must be
recognized and will be a continuous theme in this Note. For
example, the fundamental question to the antitrust analysis is,
in the language of the Copperweld Court, whether the conspiracy “deprives the marketplace of the independent centers of
decisionmaking that competition assumes and demands.”40
By contrast, the veil-piercing analysis asks whether “circumstances [were] such that adherence to the fiction of separate
corporate existence would sanction a fraud or promote injustice.”41 The equity element of the veil-piercing analysis is notably absent from the antitrust analysis. However, the corporate
law analysis’s focus on functional control is well suited to the
Copperweld Court’s concern that antitrust law not restrict the
range of permissible business structures.42
Part I discusses the background of the Copperweld decision, including the concerted action requirement under § 1 of
the Sherman Act as applied to corporations, as well as the
Copperweld decision itself. Part II considers the confusion in
the case law addressing this issue after Copperweld. Part III
assesses the divergent tests adopted by lower courts in light of
the theory underlying the concerted action requirement. Part
IV provides a brief survey of prior scholarship relating to this
39
See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 15 (1997) (“[T]he primary purpose of
the antitrust laws is to protect interbrand competition.”); Spectrum Sports, Inc. v.
McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993) (“The purpose of the [Sherman] Act is . . . to
protect the public from the failure of the market. The law directs itself not against
conduct which is competitive, even severely so, but against conduct which unfairly tends to destroy competition itself. It does so not out of solicitude for private
concerns but out of concern for the public interest.”).
40
467 U.S. 752, 769 (1984).
41
Van Dorn Co. v. Future Chem. & Oil Corp., 753 F.2d 565, 569–70 (7th Cir.
1985).
42
See Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 773 (1984).
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topic, and finally, Part V attempts to frame a coherent test for
concerted action in the context of a complex corporate family,
looking to the veil piercing doctrine under corporate law for
potentially probative factors. Parts VI and VII provide applications of this test.
I
BACKGROUND: THE UNILATERAL ACTION DEFENSE FOR
A CORPORATE FAMILY
A. Section 1 of the Sherman Act: The Concerted Action
Requirement
Early courts interpreting the Sherman Act recognized that
the breadth of the language of § 1 could reach just about any
commercial contract.43 Courts restrict the scope of liability,
therefore, by consistently imposing a threshold requirement of
concerted action, meaning an agreement between two or more
otherwise independent entities.44 The distinction between concerted and unilateral action, however, is not always immediately clear, for example where the allegedly anticompetitive
agreement arose within a trade association,45 a vertical supply
chain,46 a sports league,47 or a joint venture.48 Further, complex corporate structures raise the question of the degree of
structural unity that will allow separately incorporated entities
to claim the unilateral action defense. This Note attempts to
answer this question.
43
See, e.g., Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360–61 (1933)
(“‘Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains.’ The
familiar illustrations of partnerships, and enterprises fairly integrated in the interest of the promotion of commerce, at once occur. The question of the application of the statute is one of intent and effect, and is not to be determined by
arbitrary assumptions.” (quoting Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S.
231, 238 (1918))), overruled by Copperweld, 467 U.S. 752.
44
See Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 768 (“Congress authorized Sherman Act scrutiny of single firms only when they pose a danger of monopolization. Judging
unilateral conduct in this manner reduces the risk that the antitrust laws will
dampen the competitive zeal of a single aggressive entrepreneur.”).
45
See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 681 (1978)
(finding § 1 violation where trade association rule prohibited competitive bidding).
46
See Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 221 (1939) (finding
§ 1 violation where film distributors imposed restrictions on second-run movie
theaters).
47
See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 202–04 (2010)
(finding § 1 violation where NFL collectively licensed intellectual property to clothing producer, but noting that not all sports league-related restrictions are
anticompetitive).
48
See Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 3 (2006) (finding no § 1 per se
violation where agreement between gasoline distributors was characterized as a
procompetitive joint venture).
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B. The Concerted Action Requirement as Applied to
Corporations Pre-Copperweld
Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Copperweld Corp.
v. Independence Tube Corp.,49 lower courts relying on Supreme
Court dicta held that separately incorporated entities were independent and capable of concerted action, regardless of the
degree of control or alignment of interests between them.50
Courts reasoned that, even in the context of a parent and
wholly owned subsidiary, the choice of separate incorporation
exposed the two corporations to antitrust liability.51 This approach drew analogies to the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine.52 In earlier decisions, the Supreme Court appeared to
reject the defense of unilateral action to antitrust liability between a parent and subsidiary corporation.53 In Perma Life
Mufflers v. International Parts Corp., the Court reasoned that,
“since [defendants] availed themselves of the privilege of doing
business through separate corporations, the fact of common
ownership could not save them from any of the obligations that
the law imposes on separate entities.”54
This bright-line rule was problematic in light of courts’
concern in antitrust cases that aggressive competition can resemble anticompetitive conduct.55 The severity of antitrust
penalties calls for a strong, logical connection between compet49

467 U.S. 752 (1984).
See, e.g., George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508
F.2d 547, 557, 562 (1st Cir. 1974) (“While the doctrine recognizing what we might
call ‘thin’ conspiracies among corporations associated in one business enterprise
has not been free of criticism, it seems alive and well.”).
51
See, e.g., Tamaron Distrib. Corp. v. Weiner, 418 F.2d 137, 139 (7th Cir.
1969) (reasoning that that the choice to hire a separate entity to solicit business in
Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin rather than sending their own employee subjects
the two separate entities to antitrust laws).
52
The intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine holds that a corporation may conspire with its own agent or employee where the “corporate employee or agent
operates as an independent actor for his own self-interest, and not as a true agent
of the corporation.” HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 2:7, at
146–48 (2014).
53
See, e.g., United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 226 U.S. 61, 85–86 (1912)
(“The statute in its terms embraces every contract or combination, in form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce. This court has
repeatedly held this general phraseology embraces all forms of combination, old
and new.”).
54
392 U.S. 134, 141–42 (1968).
55
See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762 (1984)
(“[T]he economic effect of all of the conduct described above—unilateral and concerted vertical price setting, agreements on price and nonprice restrictions—is in
many, but not all, cases similar or identical. And judged from a distance, the
conduct of the parties in the various situations can be indistinguishable.” (citations omitted)).
50
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itive injury and culpability in order to avoid “chilling aggressive . . . competition,”56 and the bright-line rule simply failed to
provide this.57
C. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.58
The Copperweld Court rejected the bright-line rule that an
agreement between separately incorporated entities constitutes concerted action.59 Copperweld Corporation (Copperweld) purchased Regal Tube Corporation (Regal) from Lear
Siegler, Inc. (Lear) with a noncompete covenant.60 Regal had
been a division of Lear, but after the sale it separately incorporated as a wholly owned subsidiary of Copperweld.61 Shortly
after the transaction, David Grohne, an officer of Lear, formed
Independence Tube Corp. (Independence) to compete with
Regal.62
The newly incorporated Independence formed agreements
with suppliers to purchase equipment and inputs for production.63 Copperweld threatened legal action directly against
these suppliers for interference with the noncompete covenant,
even though Copperweld’s management knew that the covenant did not apply to Grohne individually.64 Independence’s
suppliers withdrew, and Independence sued Copperweld, Regal, and the suppliers for violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act.65
At trial, the jury found a conspiracy in violation of § 1 between
Copperweld and Regal, awarding damages trebled to almost
$7.5 million, but further found that the suppliers were not
parties to the conspiracy.66 The Seventh Circuit affirmed, but
“questioned the wisdom of subjecting an ‘intra-enterprise’ conspiracy to antitrust liability, when the same conduct by a corporation and an unincorporated division would escape liability
for lack of the requisite [concerted action].”67
56

Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 451 (2009).
See Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889–92
(2007) (suggesting that vertical agreements in restraint of intrabrand competition
are likely to enhance interbrand competition).
58
467 U.S. 752 (1984).
59
Id. at 772–74.
60
Id. at 756.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
467 U.S. 752, 756–57 (1984).
65
Id. at 757–58.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 758–59.
57
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The Supreme Court reversed on certiorari.68 The Court
announced, “[r]eview of this case calls directly into question
whether the coordinated acts of a parent and its wholly owned
subsidiary can, in the legal sense contemplated by § 1 of the
Sherman Act, constitute a combination or conspiracy.”69 The
Court answered in the negative.70
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, writing for the Court, explored the importance of concerted action under § 1. Section 2
of the Sherman Act, which treats monopolies, has no concerted
action requirement, but does require that “[t]he conduct . . . threatens actual monopolization.”71 In the absence of
this “threat-of-actual-monopolization” requirement from § 1,
Chief Justice Burger reasoned that the concerted action requirement distinguishes anticompetitive conspiracies from vigorous unilateral competition.72
Chief Justice Burger rejected as meaningless the distinction between the coordinated conduct of separate divisions of a
single corporation, and conduct coordinated between a parent
and a wholly owned subsidiary.73 He therefore rejected the
intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine as applied to a parent and
wholly owned subsidiary, declaring that antitrust liability
should not distort the choice of corporate form.74 However, the
Supreme Court carefully restricted the holding to a parent corporation with a separately incorporated, but wholly owned subsidiary.75 The Court explicitly left open the question of what
degree of ownership or alignment of interest, if any, is sufficient
to meet the unilateral action defense for a parent and less than
wholly owned subsidiary.76
The Copperweld ruling replaced a clean and manageable
(but overinclusive) unilateral action test with a rule that was
68

Id. at 759.
Id.
70
467 U.S. at 752, 771–74 (1984).
71
Id. at 767.
72
Id. (“It is not enough that a single firm appears to ‘restrain trade’ unreasonably, for even a vigorous competitor may leave that impression.”).
73
Id. at 770–71 (“A parent and its wholly owned subsidiary have a complete
unity of interest. Their objectives are common, not disparate . . . . Indeed, the
very notion of an ‘agreement’ in Sherman Act terms between a parent and a wholly
owned subsidiary lacks meaning.”).
74
Id. at 772–73 (“Separate incorporation may improve management, avoid
special tax problems arising from multistate operations, or serve other legitimate
interests. Especially in view of the increasing complexity of corporate operations,
a business enterprise should be free to structure itself in ways that serve efficiency . . . without increasing its exposure to antitrust liability.”).
75
Id. at 767.
76
Id.
69
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easy to apply to the Copperweld facts. But the Copperweld rule
is not easily extended to situations involving less than complete
ownership.77 This shift towards a more involved inquiry was
justified, however, by the underlying policies of antitrust law:78
Chief Justice Burger explained that there is a hole in the Sherman Act, whereby a corporation without monopoly market
power is free to unilaterally compete as aggressively as it can
without incurring antitrust liability.79 Even conduct that may
be fraudulent or tortious will be immune from antitrust treble
damages for such an actor.80 This gap in the coverage of antitrust law is important because it protects the legal distinction
between anticompetitive conduct and aggressive competitive
conduct.81 The former bright-line rule precluding separately
incorporated entities from pleading the unilateral action defense did not recognize the importance of this gap and rendered
aggressive competition legally risky for complex corporate
families.82
II
THE UNILATERAL ACTION DEFENSE POST-COPPERWELD
Lower courts facing Copperweld questions have applied inconsistent approaches and reached inconsistent results.83 A
few courts have strictly limited the Copperweld ruling, allowing
the unilateral action defense only to parents and wholly owned
subsidiaries.84 Most courts have focused on the factual question of the unity of interests between two corporations arising
from interrelated corporate structures; some courts have considered the totality of the circumstances, while others have
77
See Princeton Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Erie Ins. Co., 690 S.E.2d 587, 594 (W.
Va. 2009).
78
Id. (“[C]ourts have looked to the amount of control the parent company has
over its subsidiary, examining, in view of the principles enunciated in Copperweld, whether there is a unity of purpose which essentially forecloses the risk
of anticompetitive conspiracy.”).
79
Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 776–77.
80
Id. at 777.
81
Id. at 774–75.
82
See id.
83
See, e.g., Princeton Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Erie Ins. Co., 690 S.E.2d 587, 594
(W. Va. 2009) (recognizing inconsistency).
84
Aspen Title & Escrow, Inc. v. Jeld-Wen, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 1477, 1486 (D.
Or. 1987); see also Siegel Transfer, Inc. v. Carrier Exp., Inc., 856 F. Supp. 990,
997 (E.D. Pa. 1994), aff’d, 54 F.3d 1125 (3d Cir. 1995) (reasoning that a de
minimis difference between a parent’s ownership and 100% ownership does not
change the fact that the parent has complete control over the subsidiary).
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adopted a balancing test.85 This Note assesses these approaches in light of the underlying purposes of the concerted
action requirement under § 1 and the theory of the unilateral
action defense.
A. Strictly Limiting the Copperweld Ruling
Some courts have adopted a very strict reading of Copperweld, rejecting any extension of the unilateral action defense beyond the context of a parent and wholly owned
subsidiary. The U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon,
in Aspen Title & Escrow, Inc. v. Jeld-Wen, Inc., refused to countenance a unilateral action defense unless defendant corporations “are owned 100% in common, or a de minimis amount
less than 100%.”86 The court found concerted action between
defendant real estate developer and defendant title insurance
provider, where the former owned 75% of the latter’s stock.87
B. Unity-of-Interests Tests
Most courts, when faced with Copperweld questions in
novel situations, consider some formulation of a “unity-of-interests” test. For example, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, in Rohlfing v. Manor Care, Inc.,88
reasoned that a parent and majority-owned subsidiary are
likely to have a unity of interests, but that “[e]ven in cases
where the parent’s ownership interest is not strong, unity of
interest may be established if the economic objectives of the
corporations are interdependent or if the management of one
company exerts almost complete control over the other.”89 The
court found unity of interest between the parent nursing home
corporation and its 82%-owned pharmacy subsidiary.90
85
Compare Williams v. I.B. Fischer Nevada, 999 F.2d 445, 447 (9th Cir. 1993)
(“Whether corporate entities are sufficiently independent requires an examination
of the particular facts of each case.”), with Rohlfing v. Manor Care, Inc., 172
F.R.D. 330, 344 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (applying factor balancing approach), and Direct
Media Corp. v. Camden Tel. and Tel. Co., 989 F. Supp. 1211, 1216 (S.D. Ga. 1997)
(same).
86
677 F. Supp. at 1487.
87
Id. at 1486; see also Siegel Transfer, 856 F. Supp. at 997 (holding that the
Copperweld doctrine applies to a company that owns 99.92% of a subsidiary
because the economic reality was that the company was in complete control of the
subsidiary’s affairs).
88
172 F.R.D. at 344.
89
Id.
90
Id.
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The Third Circuit, in Weiss v. York Hospital,91 applied a
unity-of-interests test to find that a collection of doctors working for a single hospital were capable of conspiring in violation
of § 1:
Antitrust policy requires the courts to seek the economic
substance of an arrangement, not merely its form. The ‘substance’ of an arrangement often depends on the economic
incentive of the parties. The York medical staff is a group of
doctors, all of whom practice medicine in their individual
capacities, and each of whom is an independent economic
entity in competition with other doctors in the York medical
community.92

The Ninth Circuit also accepted a factual unity-of-interests
standard in Williams v. I.B. Fischer Nevada, finding that a Jack
in the Box franchisor and franchisee were incapable of conspiracy given their natural alignment of interests.93
The Eighth Circuit adopted a unity-of-interests test structured by evidentiary burdens in City of Mt. Pleasant v. Associated Elec. Co-op., Inc.94 The court placed upon the plaintiff the
burden of making the initial showing that any of the defendants had actually pursued interests divergent from the defendant cooperative.95 The court found that plaintiff had shown
heated internal disputes among the distributor members of an
electricity generating cooperative as to pricing but found this
insufficient: “Even though the [defendants] may quarrel among
themselves on how to divide the spoils of their economic power,
it cannot reasonably be said that they are independent sources
of that power. Their power depends, and has always depended,
on the cooperation among themselves. They are interdependent, not independent.”96
C. Factor-Balancing Approach
In Direct Media Corp. v. Camden Telephone & Telegraph
Co.,97 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia adopted a factor-balancing approach. The court enumerated three nonexhaustive factors: “[1] the interests and
objectives of each company, [2] the significant decision makers,
91
92
93
94
95
96
97

745 F.2d 786, 815 (3d Cir. 1984).
Id. (citations omitted).
999 F.2d 445, 447 (9th Cir. 1993).
838 F.2d 268, 276–77 (8th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 276.
Id. at 277.
989 F. Supp. 1211, 1216 (S.D. Ga. 1997).
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and [3] who will receive the benefit of the activity.”98 The court
concluded that the parent and subsidiary telephone service
provider qualified for the unilateral action defense and granted
summary judgment where the parent owned only 51% of the
subsidiary and plaintiff had not alleged divergent interests.99
D. Forced-Takeover Test
Before Williams, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Oregon had ruled that the unilateral action defense could only
apply where the parent corporation was capable of forcing a
merger with the subsidiary.100 The court in Leaco Enterprises,
Inc. v. General Electric Co. held that a parent corporation could
not conspire with its 91.9%-owned subsidiary, where the law of
the place of incorporation of the defendant required 67% ownership to force a merger.101
E. Identical Ownership Test
All courts following Copperweld accord immunity from § 1
liability for two corporations that, though structurally independent, share identical ownership.102 This “sister corporations”
rule closely follows the reasoning of Copperweld.103
III
ASSESSING APPROACHES TO THE UNILATERAL ACTION
DEFENSE IN LIGHT OF THE THEORY OF
CONCERTED ACTION UNDER § 1
Concerted action poses a heightened threat to competition
because individual members of a conspiracy do not need to
have significant market power for a conspiracy to restrain
trade, block new entrants, and raise consumer prices.104 An98

Id.
Id. at 1217.
100
See Leaco Enters., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 737 F. Supp. 605, 608–09 (D. Or.
1990) (relying on Sonitrol of Fresno, Inc. v. Am. T. & T. Co., No. 83-2324, 1986 WL
953, at *5–6 (D.D.C. 1986)).
101
Id.
102
See, e.g., Century Oil Tool, Inc. v. Prod. Specialties, Inc., 737 F.2d 1316,
1316 (5th Cir. 1984); Livingston Downs Racing Ass’n, Inc. v. Jefferson Downs
Corp., 257 F. Supp. 2d 819, 835 (M.D. La. 2002); Bell Atlantic Bus. Sys. Servs. v.
Hitachi Data Sys. Corp., 849 F. Supp. 702, 706 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Aspen Title &
Escrow, Inc. v. Jeld-Wen, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 1477, 1486 (D. Or. 1987).
103
See, e.g., González-Maldonado v. MMM Healthcare, Inc., 693 F.3d 244, 249
(1st Cir. 2012) (noting that Copperweld’s reasoning applies to sister corporations);
Bell Atlantic, 849 F. Supp. at 706–07.
104
See Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768–69 (1984)
(“Concerted activity inherently is fraught with anticompetitive risk. . . . Of
99
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ticompetitive agreements between competitors threaten the
fundamental principles of competition.105 But the Copperweld
Court expressed concern that mechanical applications of antitrust law should not distort the choice of corporate
structure.106
The Copperweld Court was concerned that the unilateral
action defense should not proceed from mechanical distinctions but should reflect the realities of intercorporate relationships.107 The unity-of-interests tests adopted by most of the
lower federal courts reflect this concern108 and look to the realities of the corporate relationship. But courts apply these tests
inconsistently.109 Courts that have strictly limited the Copperweld rule, finding unilateral action only between parents
and wholly owned subsidiaries, ignore the reasoning in Copperweld itself and risk distorting the choice of corporate structure.110 The forced-takeover test is also problematic because
state laws governing takeovers are themselves fairly mechanical, and the test does not necessarily look to the realities of the
corporate relationship at the time of the alleged anticompetitive
violation.111
A unity-of-interests approach is consistent with Copperweld’s reasoning and provides flexibility, but it poses the
risk of becoming unmanageably complicated and overdeterring
aggressively competitive conduct.112
The proconsumer and deterrent purposes of antitrust law
would be best served by an approach that consistently allows
courts to address the realities of the corporate relationship
through a nonexhaustive list of commonly probative factors. A
factor-balancing approach provides flexibility while also struccourse, . . . mergings [sic] of resources may well lead to efficiencies that benefit
consumers, but their anticompetitive potential is sufficient to warrant scrutiny
even in the absence of incipient monopoly.”).
105
Id. at 769 (“[Collusion] deprives the marketplace of the independent centers
of decisionmaking that competition assumes and demands.”).
106
Id. at 772–73.
107
See id. at 754 (“‘[R]ealities must dominate the judgment.’” (quoting Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360 (1933))).
108
See supra Part II.
109
Id.
110
See Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 769.
111
See Leaco Enters., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 737 F. Supp. 605, 608–09 (D. Or.
1990) (applying forced-takeover test).
112
See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 609–10 (1972) (noting
that “courts are of limited utility in examining difficult economic problems” and
that without manageable rules, “businessmen would be left with little to aid them
in predicting in any particular case what courts will find to be legal and illegal
under the Sherman Act”).
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turing the analysis and providing guidance to judges. Probative factors should illuminate issues relevant to the policy and
purposes of antitrust law, providing a threshold test for concerted action clearly based in law.
IV
PRIOR WORK IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
Writing in anticipation of the Court’s decision in Copperweld, Professor Phillip Areeda espoused the abandonment
of the bright-line rule against the unilateral action defense for
separately incorporated entities.113 Areeda’s article examined
the policy justifications for the prevailing bright-line rule and
rejected them as vacuous, suggesting that there is no economically meaningful difference between separately incorporated
but wholly owned subsidiaries and separate divisions of a single corporation.114 While Areeda’s reasoning was incorporated
only at the most theoretical level in the Court’s opinion,115
his analysis has remained influential for subsequent
commentators.116
Following the Copperweld decision, legal academics recognized that the abandonment of the bright-line rule provided
little guidance for courts facing questions of concerted action in
the context of corporate families.117 Writing shortly after the
Copperweld decision, James A. Keyte suggested that extending
the unilateral action defense to a majority-owned subsidiary
and its parent would be a straightforward extension of the Copperweld reasoning, while a rebuttable presumption of capacity
to conspire should apply to a minority owned subsidiary and its
parent absent a showing of “actual decisionmaking power and
control.”118
113
Phillip Areeda, Intraenterprise Conspiracy in Decline, 97 HARV. L. REV. 451,
552–53 (1983).
114
Id. at 463–70.
115
The Court demonstrated an awareness of Areeda’s work by repeated citation in the Copperweld opinion. See 467 U.S. at nn.9, 12, 20.
116
Citing Areeda, see Peter J. Alessandria, Intra-Entity Conspiracies and Section I of the Sherman Act: Filling the “Gap” After Copperweld Corp. v. Independence
Tube Corp., 34 BUFF. L. REV. 551, 568 (1985); Stephen Calkins, The Antitrust
Conversation, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 625, 644, 649, 655 (2001); Jennifer Stewart, The
Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Doctrine After Copperweld Corp. v. Independence
Tube Corp., 86 COLUM. L. REV. 198, 210 (1986); Judd E. Stone & Joshua D.
Wright, Antitrust Formalism Is Dead! Long Live Antitrust Formalism! Some Implications of American Needle v. NFL, CATO SUP. CT. REV. at 369, 373–74 (2010).
117
See James A. Keyte, Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.: Has
the Supreme Court Pulled the Plug on “Bathtub Conspiracy”?, 18 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
857, 869 (1985).
118
Id. at 890–91.
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Scholars have also suggested the adaptation of corporate
control tests from other areas of law for the purposes of the
antitrust analysis. Writing shortly after Copperweld, Thomas
W. McNamara proposed a large number of concrete factual
considerations that might inform the analysis of the unilateral
action defense, illustrating the sensitivity of his test to “modern
business realities” by applying it to a number of hypothetical
business structures.119 More recently, Professor Richard A.
Booth suggested a less delineated and more continuous approach to the treatment of business organizations under various questions of law involving conspiracy, based on recognition
of fiduciary duties that align the interests of constituent parts
of a single corporate family.120 In contrast, J. Matthew Schmitten suggests a return to a more formalistic approach, arguing
that the damage created by the current state of uncertainty
outweighs any salutary policy implications of a more sensitive
approach.121
Prior scholarship has not addressed the difficulties of
adapting corporate law tests for the antitrust context, arising
from potential inconsistencies in the underlying theories and
policies. For example, while Professor Booth correctly notes
the inherent artificiality of treating any form of business organization as more than the sum of its constituent parts,122 his
approach is unhelpful in a § 1 analysis of conspiracy because
antitrust theories of harm require some threshold of corporate
identity in order to identify the population of potential competitors and define the market.123
This Note seeks guidance from the corporate law analysis
for judicially manageable factors to structure the factual inquiry under Sherman Act § 1, keeping in mind potential inconsistencies in theory and policy. It focuses on first principles of
antitrust theories of harm to identify factors in corporate law
appropriate for the antitrust analysis.124
119
Thomas W. McNamara, Defining a Single Entity for the Purpose of § 1 of the
Sherman Act Post Copperweld: A Suggested Approach, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1245,
1267–73 (1985).
120
Richard A. Booth, Partnership Law and the Single Entity Defense, 18 STAN.
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 7 (2012).
121
J. Matthew Schmitten, Antitrust’s Single-Entity Doctrine: A Formalistic Approach for a Formalistic Rule, 46 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 93, 95 (2012).
122
Booth, supra note 120, at 6–7.
123
In fact, an extreme extension of Booth’s argument would suggest that there
is little purpose for a separate body of antitrust law.
124
For an analogous analysis that looks in the opposite direction, applying
concepts from antitrust law to the corporate law context, see generally Edward B.

R
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V
FRAMING A COHERENT UNITY-OF-INTERESTS TEST
The unity-of-interests tests are theoretically sound, but
they lack consistency in their formulation.125 De facto unity of
interests should be the broadest concern, as most consistent
with both the Sherman Act’s distinction between unilateral and
concerted action and with the Copperweld Court’s reasoning.126 I suggest that the clearest formulation of a test for unity
of interest is to ask whether, but for the allegedly anticompetitive agreement, the independent interests of the alleged conspirators would lead them to compete over the subject matter
of the agreement. Some factors relevant to this inquiry are
suggested by prior formulations of the unity-of-interests tests,
but very few are specific enough to provide clear guidance to
courts. Therefore, I turn to another area of law in which corporate unity-of-interest is relevant: the corporate law analysis for
“piercing the corporate veil” to attach the liabilities of a subsidiary to a parent corporation.
A. Corporate Control Under the Veil-Piercing Analysis
In certain situations, a court may abrogate the corporate
privilege of limited liability to allow a creditor of a subsidiary to
hold a parent corporation liable for its debts.127 However, veil
piercing runs afoul of powerful corporate law policies supporting limited liability.128 It is significant for this inquiry that
courts are always hesitant to pierce the corporate veil, and so
the test for corporate control is applied strictly, especially to
publicly traded corporations.129 At its core, veil piercing is an
Rock, Corporate Law Through an Antitrust Lens, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 497, 498
(1992).
125
See supra Part II.
126
See Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771–72 (1984).
127
See, e.g., Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451, 1457 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting
that a court may disregard corporate privilege in cases of fraud or where a company is merely an instrumentality of its owner).
128
See Keffer v. H.K. Porter Co., 872 F.2d 60, 64 (4th Cir. 1989) (“Although
decisions to pierce a corporate veil, exposing those behind the corporation to
liability, must be taken reluctantly and cautiously, courts will not hesitate to take
such action when justice so requires.”); Peter French, Parent Corporation Liability:
An Evaluation of the Corporate Veil Piercing Doctrine and Its Application to the Toxic
Tort Arena, 5 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 605, 607–09 (1992) (discussing the policy justifications for the principle of limited liability).
129
See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., Inc., 267
F.3d 340, 353 (3rd Cir. 2001) (“[C]ourt[s] must start from the general rule that the
corporate entity should be recognized and upheld, unless specific, unusual circumstances call for an exception. . . . Care should be taken on all occasions to
avoid making the entire theory of the corporate entity useless.” (alteration in
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equitable doctrine that gives courts discretion to circumscribe
limited liability to the extent that it unjustly interferes with the
rights of creditors and the public.130 A wholly owned subsidiary might be expected to act in the interests of the parent
corporation (as recognized, of course, by the Copperweld
Court), but where the safeguards of the corporate form have
been disregarded, courts may, in equity, disregard its limited
liability as well.131
Courts apply a two-part test to a plaintiff’s plea to pierce
the corporate veil.132 First, the court looks to the factual question of whether the parent and subsidiary operated as a single
economic unit; sometimes the inquiry is framed as whether the
subsidiary functioned as an “alter ego.”133 Second, the court
considers the equities and determines whether a failure to disregard separate corporate structures would result in injustice.134 With due regard for the theoretical inconsistencies that
emerge between antitrust and veil-piercing theories of liability,
I suggest that factors from the well-developed corporate law
inquiry may inform the distinction between concerted and unilateral action in the antitrust context as well. The equitable
prong of the veil-piercing test, as well as the policy-based resistance to piercing the corporate veil, are not applicable in the
antitrust context, and the following attempt to adapt veil-piercing factors to the antitrust context must recognize these
inconsistencies.135
One factor relevant to the corporate control prong of the
veil-piercing analysis is the degree to which statutory corporate
formalities, such as record keeping and shareholder meetings,
are disregarded.136 Disregard for corporate formalities demonoriginal) (quoting Wedner v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 296 A.2d 792,
795 (1972))).
130
But see Kurt A. Strasser, Piercing the Veil in Corporate Groups, 37 CONN. L.
REV. 637, 641 (2005) (criticizing this apparently discretionary power of the
courts).
131
For the “alter ego” formulation, see, e.g., Fletcher, 68 F.3d at 1457.
132
See Van Dorn Co. v. Future Chem. & Oil Corp., 753 F.2d 565, 569–70 (7th
Cir. 1985).
133
See id.
134
See Harper v. Delaware Valley Broads., Inc., 743 F. Supp. 1076, 1085 (D.
Del. 1990), aff’d, 932 F.2d 959 (3d Cir. 1991).
135
For example, in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), the
Court held that the Sherman Act is meant to protect competition, not to protect
competitors. This holding suggests that antitrust law is concerned only with
effects on market competition. In contrast, decisions concerning corporate liability include consideration of equitable outcomes because private parties are
harmed by (and seek relief from) corporations.
136
See, e.g., Fletcher, 68 F.3d at 1459 (noting the relevance of corporate formalities like recordkeeping and shareholder meetings to the corporate control
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strates both that the subsidiary’s decision-making process was
not independent, and that best practices for the protections of
creditors were not employed.137
A second factor relevant to the corporate control prong is
the undercapitalization of the subsidiary at the time of its incorporation.138 Undercapitalization can indicate that the subsidiary acted as a de facto division of the parent because the
subsidiary depended upon the parent corporation for operating
capital or resources to support debts. However, undercapitalization also reflects the equity inquiry in the veil-piercing analysis: the fact that the parent failed to provide for the liabilities
of the subsidiary at the time of its incorporation constitutes a
failure to adequately protect creditors.139
Other factors relevant to the veil-piercing analysis include
the intermingling of corporate assets,140 concentration of assets in one entity separate from the concentration of liabilities
in another,141 absence of corporate records, fraudulent representations to shareholders, payment by the corporation of personal obligations, and other evidence that shareholders or
owners manipulated the corporate form.142
prong of the veil-piercing analysis); Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Lake City
Janitorial, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 2d 607, 619 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (“Courts consider a
‘laundry list of factors’ to determine whether there is a ‘unity of interest’ between
two corporations or between a corporation and a controlling shareholder, ‘but the
focus is on whether the corporations have respected corporate formalities—
respected their separateness from each other—or whether one was a sham acting
at the whim of the other.’” (quoting Star Ins. Co. v. Risk Mktg. Grp. Inc., 561 F.3d
656, 660–61 (7th Cir. 2009))).
137
See In re Rood, 448 B.R. 149, 163 (Bankr. D. Md. 2011) (“The alter ego
doctrine may be applied ‘where the corporate entity has been used as a subterfuge
and to observe it would work an injustice, the rationale being that if the shareholders or the corporations themselves disregard the proper formalities of a corporation, then the law will do likewise as necessary to protect individual and
corporate creditors.’” (quoting Hildreth v. Tidewater Equip. Co., 838 A.2d 1204,
1210 (Md. 2003)).
138
See, e.g., Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Polan, 939 F.2d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 1991)
(noting a subsidiary’s “gross undercapitalization” as a factor in ruling the corporate-control prong satisfied); Keffer v. H.K. Porter Co., 872 F.2d 60, 65 (4th Cir.
1989).
139
See, e.g., In re Antone’s Records, Inc., 445 B.R. 758, 785 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
2011) (“The theory of undercapitalization permits the veil to be pierced if the
corporation was undercapitalized to the point that it created an injustice.”).
140
See Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 519, 521–22 (7th Cir.
1991).
141
See Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc., 353 S.E.2d 93, 98–99 (W. Va. 1986).
142
See, e.g., InterGen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 149 (1st Cir. 2003) (“The
independent operations prong, for instance, looks at such things as . . . failure to
maintain adequate records . . . and [ ] diversion of the corporation’s funds or
assets to noncorporate uses.”); Middle Tenn. News Co. v. Charnel of Cincinnati,
Inc., 250 F.3d 1077, 1081 n.3 (7th Cir. 2001) (“A court must balance evidence
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While significant overlap between the boards of directors or
officers of the two corporations is entirely permissible,143 the
court looks with disfavor upon directors or officers who appear
to prioritize the interests of the parent while acting on behalf of
the subsidiary.144 The direction of operations of the subsidiary
by one who is an officer of the parent only is a warning sign,145
indicating both disregard for corporate formalities and the operation of the subsidiary as a de facto division.
B. Relevance of Veil-Piercing Factors for the Unilateral
Action Defense
Some inconsistencies emerge between the underlying theories and policies of Sherman Act § 1 and the veil-piercing analysis. Antitrust law is concerned first and foremost with general
consumer protection,146 while the veil-piercing doctrine protects contractual and tort creditors of the mismanaged subsidiary.147 Antitrust law proceeds from a legislative determination
that competitive markets are preferable to concentrated or collusive ones.148 Veil piercing’s theoretical underpinnings are in
equity, and it considers primarily the specific relationship between the parties.149 These policy inconsistencies do not negate the relevance of veil-piercing factors for the antitrust
inquiry, but they recommend caution and careful translation of
veil-piercing factors to the antitrust question of collusion.
Of course, the most significant practical divergence between the antitrust and veil-piercing analyses is the position
preferred by the corporate defendants. In the antitrust analysis, the corporate parent defendant will want to demonstrate
of . . . fraudulent representation by corporation shareholders or directors . . . and
other shareholder acts or conduct ignoring, controlling or manipulating the corporate form.”).
143
See Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451, 1460 (2d Cir. 1995).
144
See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 72 (1998).
145
Id.
146
See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
147
See, e.g., RDM Holdings, Ltd. v. Cont’l Plastics Co., 762 N.W.2d 529, 550
(Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (“The traditional basis for piercing the corporate veil has
been to protect a corporation’s creditors where there is a unity of interest of the
stockholders and the corporation and where the stockholders have used the corporate structure in an attempt to avoid legal obligations.” (quoting Rymal v.
Baergen, 686 N.W.2d 241, 252 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004))).
148
See Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359–60 (1933),
overruled by Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (discussing legislative intent behind the Sherman Act).
149
See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Stover, 327 F.2d 288, 291 (8th Cir. 1964)
(“The [veil-piercing] doctrine is founded in equity and is applied only when the
facts warrant its application to prevent an injustice.”).
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that the subsidiary is very closely aligned with its interest: so
much so that an agreement between them is hardly necessary.
By contrast, the corporate defendant in the veil-piercing analysis will want to claim that the subsidiary pursues divergent
interests with complete independence.150 But note that, in
most cases, the interests of the parent as major shareholder
will be significantly aligned with the interests of the subsidiary
in its own health and longevity, and this will not require any
interference with corporate formalities.151
The undercapitalization factor illuminates this divergence.
Under the veil-piercing analysis, undercapitalization is treated
as probative of an inequitable purpose (or dispositive, in some
jurisdictions).152 In the antitrust context, undercapitalization
may indicate a close alignment of interests. Undercapitalization may therefore weigh against a finding of concerted action
in violation of § 1, but simultaneously expose the parent to veilpiercing liability.153
The equity prong of the veil-piercing analysis may allow for
harmonization between a defendant’s positions in the veilpiercing and the § 1 analyses. Veil piercing usually requires
some showing of fraud, wrongdoing, or at the very least serious
mismanagement to the injury of creditors of the subsidiary.154
150
For a case in which a defendant attempted to “have it both ways,” see Bell
Atlantic Bus. Sys. Servs. v. Hitachi Data Sys. Corp., 849 F. Supp. 702, 707 (N.D.
Cal. 1994) (dismissing § 1 claim for lack of concerted action, but remanding for
discovery on the veil-piercing question).
151
See, e.g., Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451, 1458–61 (2d Cir. 1995)
(“[T]his type of conduct[—requiring the parent corporation’s approval of significant contracts—]is typical of a majority shareholder or parent corporation.”).
152
Compare Flame S.A. v. Indus. Carriers, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 3d 493, 506 (E.D.
Va. 2014), aff’d sub nom., Flame S.A. v. Freight Bulk Pte. Ltd., 762 F.3d 352 (4th
Cir. 2014) (treating undercapitalization as probative but not dispositive (citing De
Witt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 687 (4th
Cir.1976))), and In re BH S & B Holdings LLC, 420 B.R. 112, 136 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2009), aff’d as modified, 807 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“[Under Delaware
law,] undercapitalization is rarely sufficient to pierce the corporate veil.”), with
N.L.R.B. v. Greater Kansas City Roofing, 2 F.3d 1047, 1053 n.8 (10th Cir. 1993)
(“[U]ndercapitalization could be found to be a sufficient indication of fraud or
inequity in certain cases where the corporation was substantially undercapitalized in light of the nature and magnitude of the corporate undertaking.”), and In re
Antone’s Records, Inc., 445 B.R. 758, 785 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2011) (“The theory of
undercapitalization permits the veil to be pierced if the corporation was undercapitalized to the point that it created an injustice.”).
153
See Freeman v. San Diego Ass’n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 1147–48 (9th
Cir. 2003) (“[The single-entity defense applies] to ‘partnerships or other joint arrangements in which persons who would otherwise be competitors pool their
capital and share the risks of loss as well as the opportunities for profit.’” (quoting
Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 356 (1982))).
154
See Van Dorn Co. v. Future Chem. & Oil Corp., 753 F.2d 565, 569–70 (7th
Cir. 1985).
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Absent these elements, limited liability will be respected in
most jurisdictions regardless of the degree of control exerted by
the parent over the subsidiary.155 Therefore, absent misconduct, the parent corporation is safe from veil-piercing liability
even though the structure of the parent and subsidiary are so
closely aligned that the two function as a single decision maker
under the antitrust analysis.156
Although the separate theories of liability lend different
roles to these factors in the antitrust and veil-piercing contexts,
the underlying inquiry is fundamentally similar. Namely, is
this formally separate corporate structure reflected in the understandings of the parties of their unified or separate interests, as evidenced by the operations of the subsidiary?
C. Probative Value of Veil-Piercing Factors to the
Unilateral Action Defense
Bearing in mind the above discussion of consistencies and
conflicts between antitrust and veil-piercing policies, this Note
next considers the probative value of veil-piercing factors for
the unilateral action defense.
1. Adherence to Statutory Corporate Formalities
Corporate formalities hold more than just normative value;
the formalities of corporate decision making protect the interests of investors and creditors.157 Disregard for corporate formalities is a useful consideration for the unilateral action
defense: it indicates that the interests of noncontrolling shareholders and creditors might be insufficiently weighed in the
subsidiary’s decision-making process, possibly because the decision-making process is dominated by the parent.158
155
See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fast Lane Car Serv., Inc., 681 F. Supp. 2d
340, 347 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Generally, corporate officers will not be liable for
breach of contract absent a showing that it is necessary to pierce the corporate
veil to prevent inequity.”).
156
See Iceland Telecom, Ltd. v. Info. Sys. & Networks Corp., 268 F. Supp. 2d
585, 589–91 (D. Md. 2003).
157
See In re Rood, 448 B.R. 149, 163 (Bankr. D. Md. 2011) (veil piercing has
been applied “where the corporate entity has been used as a subterfuge and to
observe it would work an injustice, the rationale being that if the shareholders or
the corporations themselves disregard the proper formalities of a corporation,
then the law will do likewise as necessary to protect individual and corporate
creditors” (quoting Hildreth v. Tidewater Equip. Co., 838 A.2d 1204, 1210 (Md.
2003))).
158
See Parker v. Bell Asbestos Mines, Ltd., 607 F. Supp. 1397, 1399 (E.D. Pa.
1985) (to pierce the corporate veil, plaintiff must show that “[t]he corporate entity
being disregarded [is] so controlled as to have essentially no ‘mind’ of its own”).
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A problem with any doctrine that contemplates a conspiracy between corporations is that the courts must decide what a
decision by a corporate entity really looks like. When corporate
formalities are followed, a corporate decision may be identified
in a resolution of the board, a shareholder vote, or significant
decisions within the purview of executive officers.159 Corporate
formalities, in a sense, are the decision-making processes of
the corporation. Where corporate formalities of the subsidiary
are completely ignored, then, the subsidiary lacks an independent center of decision making. The absence of what might, in
other contexts, be called an agreement between the corporations is meaningless because the subsidiary has no mechanism through which it could decide to compete with the parent.
One corporate formality especially important to the veilpiercing analysis is the maintenance of detailed and accurate
corporate records.160 This factor is suffused with considerations from the equity prong of the veil-piercing analysis, because accurate recordkeeping makes it more difficult for
corporations to conceal fraud.161 Accurate recordkeeping may
play a more limited but conflicted role in the antitrust context.
The absence of records of a corporate decision may suggest
that independent decision making did not occur. However, it
may also indicate just the opposite: that cartel-like agreements
were taking place in the apocryphal “hotel room.” Absence of
accurate records should therefore be treated with caution, and
should not automatically raise a presumption in either
direction.
2. Overlap Between Officers and Directors: The “Two
Hats” Problem
It is worth briefly noting that corporate law does not necessarily consider a significant overlap between the boards of directors or officers of the parent and subsidiary to be

159

See Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451, 1459–61 (2d Cir. 1995).
See id. at 1459 (analyzing and determining that defendant Atex followed
corporate formalities, including thorough recordkeeping).
161
See Kaplan v. First Options of Chi., Inc., 19 F.3d 1503, 1521 (3d Cir. 1994),
aff’d, 514 U.S. 938 (1995) (“Not every disregard of corporate formalities or failure
to maintain corporate records justifies piercing the corporate veil. That remedy is
available only if it is also shown that a corporation’s affairs and personnel were
manipulated to such an extent that it became nothing more than a sham used to
disguise the alter ego’s use of its assets for his own benefit in fraud of its
creditors.”).
160
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improper.162 It is assumed that the dual-director or dual-officer is able to serve his fiduciary duty to the parent when
acting in his capacity as its agent, and his fiduciary duty to the
subsidiary when acting in his capacity as its agent: he wears
“two hats.”163
Recognizing that corporate formalities may constitute the
decision-making process of the corporation, there is no problem with finding that a single individual may act separately as
decision maker for one corporation in some settings, and as
decision maker for another (potentially competing) corporation
in other settings.164 While agency problems might arise from a
situation in which a single individual serves on the board of
directors of competing firms, the director’s duty would be to
instruct each corporation to compete with the other, if competition would be in the best interests of each. But just like in the
veil-piercing analysis, if a director or officer who only represents the parent corporation is permitted to direct the operations of the subsidiary, this would indicate that the subsidiary
is not an independent center of decisionmaking.165
3. Undercapitalization
Undercapitalization is a central factor in the veil-piercing
analysis for the obvious reason that it determines the assets
available to creditors of the subsidiary, and therefore is of particular concern to plaintiffs.166 However, only capitalization at
the time of incorporation is held to be probative of the veilpiercing analysis because courts have stopped short of imposing a duty to bail out a failing subsidiary.167
Undercapitalization may also be relevant to the unilateral
action defense. In the absence of an agreement, a drastically
undercapitalized subsidiary would be unable to compete. However, unlike the veil-piercing analysis, undercapitalization
should be considered at the time of the allegedly anticompeti162
See Fletcher, 68 F.3d at 1460 (“Parents and subsidiaries frequently have
overlapping boards of directors while maintaining separate business
operations.”).
163
See Forsythe v. Clark USA, Inc., 836 N.E.2d 850, 862 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005),
aff’d, 864 N.E.2d 227 (Ill. 2007) (McNulty J., dissenting).
164
But see Sky Angel U.S., LLC v. Nat’l Cable Satellite Corp., 33 F. Supp. 3d
14, 20 (D.D.C. 2014) (assuming, without deciding, “that antitrust law and fiduciary duty principles do not perfectly align in such a fashion”).
165
See Forsythe, 836 N.E.2d at 862 (McNulty, J., dissenting).
166
See Slottow v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, 10 F.3d 1355, 1360 (9th Cir. 1993)
(suggesting that undercapitalization may be dispositive in California).
167
See Truckweld Equip. Co. v. Olson, 618 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Wash. Ct. App.
1980).
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tive agreement. The intentions of the firms at the time of incorporation are irrelevant to the question of whether, at the time of
the agreement, the two firms were potential competitors. Undercapitalization should also be judged in light of the substance of the agreement: where a subsidiary is capitalized just
enough to fulfill an agreed-upon purpose, it is unlikely to be an
independent decision maker.
4. Intermingling of Assets
The veil-piercing analysis treats the intermingling of assets
between two corporations with care. Courts do not condemn
corporate financial practices that streamline management
across interrelated corporate structures through centralized
accounting systems.168 On the other hand, courts are highly
skeptical of closely held corporations where all of the corporation’s assets are kept in a personal bank account of a majority
shareholder.169 Somewhere between these two extremes,
courts view intermingling of assets as probative of an understanding between corporations regarding their own corporate
separateness.
The application of this factor to the antitrust analysis is
much more clearly aligned with theory. Corporations with divergent interests are unlikely to intermingle assets. This is not
to discount significant antitrust cases in which defendants
have formed closely held corporations or holding companies to
manage assets related to an anticompetitive agreement.170 But
where corporate funds for all purposes are intermingled, this
suggests a close alignment of interests. Where only funds utilized in the furtherance of a particular agreement are intermingled, perhaps this would be evidence that interests would not
be so closely aligned absent an anticompetitive agreement.
5. Concentration of Assets or Liabilities
The concentration of assets in one corporation separate
from the concentration of liabilities in another is a highly suspect practice under the veil-piercing analysis, but there are
legitimate business reasons why a complex corporate family
may choose this type of allocation. The fact that a parent cor168
169

See Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451, 1459 (2d Cir. 1995).
See Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 519, 521 (7th Cir.

1991).
170
See, e.g., United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 226 U.S. 61, 85 (1912)
(holding that domination and control forbidden by Sherman Antitrust Act can be
effected by grant of controlling stock to competitor or creation of a holding
company).
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poration can impose its liabilities upon a subsidiary is all but
dispositive of the alignment of interests, however, and suggests
that the two would under no circumstances compete with each
other.
However, this factor may be misleading where potential
competitors have colluded to design this allocation across
jointly held subsidiaries. Antitrust law recognizes that anticompetitive agreements might invite cheating. Courts therefore look for evidence of certain types of arrangements that help
conspiring parties enforce their agreement.171 Where multiple
parent corporations jointly own an asset-concentrated subsidiary and a liability-concentrated subsidiary, this could be interpreted as a method of enforcing an agreement between them.
An agreement that requires enforcement measures suggests
that the conspirators would otherwise compete.
D. Synthesis
The above factors are not exhaustive of the veil-piercing
analysis, but they provide a good sample of categories for considerations. Courts reframe these factors to make them relevant to the facts of individual veil-piercing cases, but the
reasoning and the analogy to the antitrust context remains
similar.
I suggest that these factors are probative of whether corporations’ independent interests would lead them to compete but
for an anticompetitive agreement between them. For example,
a subsidiary that does not conform to corporate formalities
may simply lack the independent processes necessary to reach
a decision to compete with the parent corporation. This conclusion is not necessary, however, where there is merely significant overlap between the directors and officers of the two
corporations. But at all times the factual inquiry remains
whether the structure and practices of the parties demonstrate
sufficiently divergent interests that, absent an agreement, they
would compete with regard to the substance of the
agreement.172
171
See Donald S. Clark, Price-Fixing Without Collusion: An Antitrust Analysis
of Facilitating Practices After Ethyl Corp., 1983 WIS. L. REV. 887, 901–02 (1983)
(discussing contractual clauses with buyers that function to enforce collusive
behavior between sellers).
172
Alternatively, the burden of proof could be reversed. The inquiry could be
framed as whether the structure and practices of the corporations demonstrate
sufficient alignment of interest to escape antitrust liability.
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A parent corporation’s concentration of assets or liabilities
in a subsidiary normally suggests a high degree of alignment of
interests. A corporation that is drastically undercapitalized is
unlikely to be independent enough to choose to compete with a
parent corporation. Where assets are generally intermingled,
this would seem to also suggest recognition on the part of both
parties of a close alignment of interests. By contrast, where
assets are intermingled only for a specific purpose, or are
structured in some other way so as to isolate intermingled
assets from the general assets of either corporation, this could
suggest divergence in interests.
The parent’s percentage ownership in the subsidiary (a
central concern for lower courts addressing the antitrust question of conspiracy after Copperweld) seems to be absent from
the above analysis, but in fact it underlies all of the above
considerations. The more significant the majority share, the
more likely that the parent can impose structures that reflect
an alignment of interests. Where the subsidiary is less than
wholly owned, on the other hand, the board of directors has
fiduciary duties running to minority shareholders that require
them to resist parental control and to direct the subsidiary in
competition with the parent if this would best serve the subsidiary’s interests. In practice, the question will be a difficult one
for directors. The greater the majority stake, the more easily
they will be ousted by the parent for failing to align the subsidiary with the parent’s interests.
The percentage of the majority share provides no brightline rule for distinguishing between concerted and unilateral
action in the above analysis. This fact is a strength of the
approach. It means that consistency can be reached regardless of divergent state law, and it also reflects the Copperweld
Court’s admonition to consider the realities of the relationship.
A majority shareholder, even a very significant one, may be
disinterested or may decide to exert control. The fact of its
majority stake alone cannot predetermine the realities of the
alignment of interests between it and the subsidiary.
VI
APPLICATION: WESLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, LLC V. FORREST
COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS173
The framework developed above for distinguishing between
concerted and unilateral action for the purpose of § 1 liability
173

No. 2:12-CV-59-KS-MTP, 2014 WL 232109 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 22, 2014).
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may be illustrated by application to the facts of a recent case,
Wesley Health System, LLC. Plaintiff Wesley Medical Center
(Wesley) alleged that defendants Forrest General Hospital (Forest General) and AAA Ambulance Service (AAA) conspired to
divert customers despite their express preference for Wesley.174
Wesley claimed that defendants falsified medical records, defamed Wesley, and obtained a disproportionate share of state
trauma funds through misrepresentation.175 Forrest General
raised a unilateral action defense to the Sherman Act claim,
noting its close corporate relationship with AAA.176 With regard to that claim, the court found the following facts:
[AAA] was [incorporated] by the Board of Trustees of [Forrest
County] . . . . The bylaws require that Forrest General fund
half of AAA’s operating deficits and capital expenditures,
while the City and County each contribute one-fourth of the
necessary funds. . . .
AAA is owned by Forrest General, the City [and]
County . . . . Four of the directors represent Forrest General,
while the City [and] County each have one representative on
the Board . . . . Additionally, the Chairman of AAA’s Board—
Evan Dillard—is the Chairman, President, and CEO of Forrest General. AAA’s officers . . . are all employees of Forrest
General.
As for AAA’s operations, Forrest General and AAA executed a General Management Services Agreement [by which]
Forrest General . . . provide[s] AAA’s management. But the
contract specifically provides that “AAA has, and at all times
during the Term shall exercise, the ultimate control and direction of the assets and affairs of Service.” . . .
Dillard . . . testified that AAA submits its budget to Forrest General for approval, and that AAA’s financial statements are consolidated with Forrest General’s. . . . AAA
maintains a separate “set of books and records” from Forrest
General.177

The court went on to say that “corporate formalities are
meaningless,” declaring the correct test for the unilateral action defense to be “whether [the agreement] joins together separate decisionmakers.”178 It held that AAA and Forrest General
constitute a single decision maker.179 I suggest, to the con174
175
176
177
178
179

Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *8–9 (citations omitted).
Id. at *9 (quoting Am. Needle Inc., v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 195 (2010)).
Wesley Health Sys. LLC., 2014 WL 232109, at *9.
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trary, that corporate formalities are highly probative of whether
an agreement joins separate decision makers.
As previously discussed, corporate formalities can provide
substance to the concept of corporate decisions. Here, AAA has
a board of directors and shareholders that are sophisticated
and capable of participating in corporate governance. The fact
of extensive overlap between the officers and directors of Forrest General and AAA should not be dispositive, as the officers
have unique fiduciary duties to each corporation.
In addition to Forrest General, which may or may not be
the majority shareholder (the court does not specify), AAA has
two other shareholders, the City and County, with divergent
interests from those of Forrest General. The directors of AAA
have a fiduciary duty running to the corporation for the benefit
of all shareholders. Further, the City and County are exceptional in that they may enforce their interests through external,
regulatory pressures. The board would be extremely misguided
if it favored the interests of Forrest General to the detriment of
the interests of these other shareholders.
The board of AAA contracted its management and operation to Forrest General, perhaps suggesting an understanding
between the two that the former be run as a de facto division of
the latter. However, the contract maintained separation of assets, and AAA retained ultimate control of these assets. Forrest
General contributed funds to AAA, but did not treat those
funds as its own, once committed.
There is, however, an additional factor uniquely relevant to
the divergence of interests here. Ambulance services are governed by statute and highly regulated, as the court notes, including protections for patients’ choice of hospital
destination.180 AAA, through the oversight of its board of directors, has a strong interest in conforming to regulations, so AAA
has interests significantly divergent from those of Forrest
General.
An ambulance service is of course not a natural competitor
for a hospital. But AAA’s interests are sufficiently divergent
from those of Forrest General that, absent the alleged agreement, it would adhere to law and regulation in serving Forrest
General’s competitors, contrary to the practices alleged by the
plaintiff. It therefore would “compete” with Forrest General regarding the substance of the alleged agreement.
180

See id. at *3–5.
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VII
APPLICATION: ROBERTSON V. SEA PINES
REAL ESTATE COS.181
A case recently before the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
illustrates the power of the analysis developed here for distinguishing between procompetitive joint ventures and anticompetitive collusive conduct. In Robertson v. Sea Pines Real
Estate Companies,182 customers of two real estate listing services alleged that the services’ bylaws excluded innovative and
low-cost competitors from a resource critical to the local real
estate brokerage businesses.183 Defendants included Consolidated Multiple Listing Service of Columbia, Inc., a multiple
listing service (MLS) that provided a database of real estate
listings to its dues-paying members, as well as various licensed
real estate brokerage firms that, through their personnel,
served on the MLS Boards of Trustees.184
On interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss, the Court of Appeals recognized
the following specific allegations:
A multiple listing service . . . is an incorporated joint
venture that, among other things, maintains a database of
properties listed for sale in the MLS service area, which its
member brokerages use to post and find property listings. . . . Particularly in an area served by only one MLS,
access to MLS resources may be critical for a brokerage to
successfully participate in the relevant real estate
market. . . .
...
The complaints allege that while serving on the . . . MLS
board[ ] of trustees, defendants conspired to restrain competition in their respective real estate markets in violation of § 1
of the Sherman Antitrust Act. According to the complaints,
defendants used the MLS “as a conduit” to “create[ ] rules . . .
“which “inhibit[ed] competition” and “illegally stabilized the
prices” paid by plaintiffs as customers of real estate brokerage services. Specifically, the complaints allege that the rules
passed by the defendants were designed to exclude innovative, lower-priced competitors and thus insulate the defendants from competitive pressures posed by brokerages that
181

679 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2012).
Id.
183
Id. at 283.
184
Second Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 1–10, Robertson v. Sea Pines Real Estate Co., 679 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2012) (No. 3:09-1335-SB), 2010 WL 1787986.
182
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offered a larger menu of service[s] . . . and alternative
pricing . . . .
. . . [T]he defendants aimed to exclude lower-priced internet-based brokerages from the MLS by requiring, among
other things, that member brokerages maintain a physical
office in the MLS service area.185

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of the
defendants’ motion to dismiss; rejecting the defendants’ argument that the bylaws constituted unilateral corporate action on
the part of the MLS, and were thus immune from § 1 liability
under Copperweld, the court held that “the alleged conspiracy
joins independent centers of decisionmaking that are capable
of conspiring under section 1.”186
The Court of Appeals drew an analogy between the case
before it and American Needle, Inc. v. National Football
League,187 in which the Supreme Court held that the bylaws of
the National Football League (NFL) might in some circumstances constitute concerted action where they govern otherwise competing economic interests.188 In American Needle, the
Supreme Court, citing Copperweld, held that the individual
teams of the NFL lacked a unity of interest with regard to the
licensing of intellectual property, and would compete absent
league rules providing for the aggregate licensing of teams’ intellectual property.189
The Robertson court noted that, like the individual teams of
the NFL, the individual brokerage firms that manage the MLS
are “ ‘substantial, independently owned, and independently
managed business[es]’ that [are] ‘guided . . . [by a] “separate
corporate consciousness[ ].”’ And therefore, like the NFL
teams, the individual brokerages lack a ‘complete unity of interest’ and ‘do not possess either the unitary decisionmaking
quality or the single aggregation of economic power characteristic of independent action.’ ”190
However, the Robertson court’s extension of the American
Needle reasoning is problematic. Although the American Needle Court cautioned that joint ventures do not receive Copperweld immunity for agreements between erstwhile
185

Robertson v. Sea Pines Estate Cos., 679 F.3d 278, 282–83 (4th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 283 (quoting Boland v. Consol. Multiple Listing Serv., Inc., 868 F.
Supp. 2d 506, 511 (D.S.C. 2011).
187
560 U.S. 183 (2010).
188
Robertson, 679 F.3d at 284–86.
189
American Needle, 560 U.S. at 196–200.
190
Robertson, 679 F.3d at 285 (quoting American Needle, 560 U.S. at 196).
186
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competitors,191 joint ventures have traditionally been treated
with caution under antitrust law. Courts recognize that some
joint ventures can be procompetitive or offer consumers an
otherwise impossible new product.192 The Robertson court’s
straightforward extension of American Needle eviscerates this
limited protection for joint ventures, threatening to blur the
line between procompetitive joint ventures and anticompetitive
concerted action. This loss of clarity regarding the scope of
antitrust liability is likely to chill procompetitive joint ventures,
such as the essential information services provided by the MLS
at issue in Robertson.
Greater clarity could be rendered from the Robertson decision by engaging critically with the factual circumstances supporting the court’s conclusory decision that the component
brokerages of the MLS lacked sufficient unity of interest to
invoke Copperweld immunity. The veil-piercing factors discussed above provide meaningful content to this analysis, beyond general analogies to past cases.
The Robertson plaintiffs in effect allege that the defendant
brokerage directors have adopted bylaws that undercapitalize
the MLS in service of those brokerages’ exogenous interests.193
Information assets are concentrated in the MLS, but further
access to capital (in the form of membership fees paid by potential new members) is subordinated to the interests of the existing brokerage members in limiting access to these
information assets.194 This fact is evidence that the structural
relationship between the MLS and the brokerages is such that
the MLS has no capacity to act independently to safeguard its
own interests.
There is no suggestion that the assets of the MLS are intermingled with the assets of the brokerages, but given the structure of the MLS’s corporate family, this separateness suggests
the MLS is best categorized as a limited purpose corporate
vehicle operated for the benefit of members, rather than a
stand-alone corporate entity with independent economic
interest.
191

See American Needle, 560 U.S. at 201–02.
See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 21–24 (1979)
(“Joint ventures and other cooperative arrangements are [ ] not usually unlawful,
at least not as price-fixing schemes, where the agreement on price is necessary to
market the product at all.”).
193
Robertson, 679 F.3d at 282.
194
See id. at 286 (referring to “the power of MLS board members to pass
restrictive membership rules” that can “threaten economic harm to
nonmembers”).
192

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-2\CRN204.txt

502

unknown

Seq: 36

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

30-DEC-15

11:16

[Vol. 101:467

Defendant brokerages argued that the plaintiffs alleged
only corporate action on the part of the MLS, which can only
act through its trustees.195 They contend that the plaintiffs
failed to allege anything beyond normal corporate formalities:
“The complaints allege no wrongful act by any Defendant except those allegedly performed by Defendants while serving as
MLS Board members. The complaints do not allege Defendants
were acting outside their normal duties as Board members.”196
Overlap between the executives and directors of parent and
subsidiary corporations is not necessarily grounds for concluding that the interests of the two are functionally aligned, but a
subsidiary acting contrary to its own interests is a strong indication that the structure of the corporate relationship leaves
little space for the subsidiary to make independent decisions.
The Robertson plaintiffs alleged—and the Court of Appeals
agreed—that the MLS bylaws were incongruous with the interests of a joint venture.197 Membership dues fund the MLS.198
Bylaws restricting membership based on criteria irrelevant to
the provision of the MLS’s services were therefore found clearly
contrary to the interests of the incorporated MLS, reflecting
instead the anticompetitive interests of the brokerages on the
Board of Trustees in excluding potential competitors from an
essential service.199 There is little evidence in the record,
therefore, that the MLS constitutes a separate center of economic decision making, rather than a subsidiary organization
subordinated to the interests of its brokerage directors.
Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit reached the correct conclusion through its analogy to American Needle: the individual
brokerages, like the individual teams of the NFL, are the relevant actors whose interests are served through adoption of the
allegedly anticompetitive bylaws.200 No conspiracy may exist
between the MLS and its brokerage directors because no independent interests motivate the MLS, but a conspiracy may exist between the parent brokerages through the artifices of the
subsidiary MLS. Because the MLS is not an independent economic decision maker, it cannot extend the unilateral action
defense to the concerted action of the brokerage directors.
195
Brief for Appellants at 13–18, Robertson v. Sea Pines Real Estate Cos., 679
F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-1539).
196
Id. at 6.
197
Robertson, 679 F.3d at 285–86.
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
Id. at 285.
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At the core of the Robertson decision is a subtle rule of law
recognizing that the framing of the question of unilateral action
depends upon the specific anticompetitive conduct alleged.
Courts should look to the nature of the allegedly anticompetitive agreement with care to distinguish between procompetitive
coordination and a joint venture that drifts across the legal
delineation of cartel conduct. The economic interests relevant
to the question of collusion will depend upon the nature of the
agreement. The question of whether two defendants constitute
a single decision-making entity is contextual. Just as the NFL
may constitute a single center of decision making with regard
to some categories of decisions, as recognized by American Needle,201 the MLS may constitute a single center of decision making with regard to decisions governing the method of
aggregation of information, the extension of other services to
members, etc.; but with regards to the allegedly anticompetitive
membership criteria that exclude potential competitors, the
relevant interests are demonstrably those of the brokerage directors, and any relevant independent interests of the MLS are
vacuous.
CONCLUSION
The unilateral action defense against liability under § 1 of
the Sherman Act protects the legal distinction between anticompetitive collusion and aggressive competition, a distinction fundamental to the consumer protection purposes of
antitrust law. A manageable analytical framework for the unilateral action defense is necessary for it to perform this role.
One benefit of looking to the veil-piercing analysis for guidance
is that case law in that area is extensively developed, providing
a wealth of guidance to courts considering the factors proposed
in this Note. The post-Copperweld approaches adopted by
many lower courts, by contrast, either require assessment of
the entirety of the circumstances or draw focus to factors too
vague or narrow to provide consistent guidance.
Relevant veil-piercing factors that provide for more discrete
and manageable analysis of the unilateral-action defense include adherence to corporate formalities, adequate capitalization, and intermingling of corporate assets. All of these factors
add meaning to the percentage ownership position of the parent corporation, completing the conceptual link between ownership and unity of interests sufficient to preclude competition
201

Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 202 (2010).
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between two corporations, even absent an anticompetitive
agreement. Strengthening this conceptual link serves to protect the distinction between anticompetitive conduct and aggressive competition.

